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Despite being a pan-cultural phenomenon, laughter is arguably the least understood
behaviour deployed in social interaction. As well as being a response to humour, it has
other important functions including promoting social affiliation, developing cooperation
and regulating competitive behaviours. This multi-functional feature of laughter marks
it as an adaptive behaviour central to facilitating social cohesion. However, it is not
clear how laughter achieves this social cohesion. We consider two approaches to
understanding how laughter facilitates social cohesion – the ‘representational’ approach
and the ‘affect-induction’ approach. The representational approach suggests that
laughter conveys information about the expresser’s emotional state, and the listener
decodes this information to gain knowledge about the laugher’s felt state. The affect-
induction approach views laughter as a tool to influence the affective state of listeners.
We describe a modified version of the affect-induction approach, in which laughter is
combined with additional factors – including social context, verbal information, other
social signals and knowledge of the listener’s emotional state – to influence an interaction
partner. This view asserts that laughter by itself is ambiguous: the same laughter
may induce positive or negative affect in a listener, with the outcome determined
by the combination of these additional factors. Here we describe two experiments
exploring which of these approaches accurately describes laughter. Participants judged
the genuineness of audio–video recordings of social interactions containing laughter.
Unknown to the participants the recordings contained either the original laughter or
replacement laughter from a different part of the interaction. When replacement laughter
was matched for intensity, genuineness judgements were similar to judgements of
the original unmodified recordings. When replacement laughter was not matched for
intensity, genuineness judgements were generally significantly lower. These results
support the affect-induction view of laughter by suggesting that laughter is inherently
underdetermined and ambiguous, and that its interpretation is determined by the
context in which it occurs.
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INTRODUCTION
Because of its ubiquitous nature laughter has become a recent focus of research across a range of
scientific disciplines. The thesis that it is an evolutionarily ancient behaviour preceding spoken
language is supported by reports of laughter-like behaviour in non-human primates (Davila Ross
et al., 2009, Davila-Ross et al., 2011) and of similarities in acoustic elements of laughter in humans
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and play vocalisations of other primates (Vettin and Todt, 2005).
As in human infants (Rothbart, 1973) laughter-like behaviour in
chimpanzees prolongs play actions (Matsusaka, 2004), suggesting
that laughter is an important tool for promoting social affiliation
and developing cooperative and competitive behaviours (Davila-
Ross et al., 2011). Thus from an evolutionary perspective laughter
can be viewed as a key adaptive behaviour because of its
facilitative effect on social cohesion.
Just as speech follows a set of rules so too, it seems, does
laughter, with conversation analysis uncovering a number of
rules of laughter behaviour (Glenn, 2003; Holt, 2010, 2011).
For example in dyadic conversations the speaker is more likely
than the listener to laugh first, while in group conversations the
listeners are more likely to laugh first (Glenn, 2003). Laughter
also has a regulatory function in conversations by serving as a
turn-taking cue or signalling that the speaker may be approaching
a transition point in his/her utterance (O’Donnell Trujillo and
Adams, 1983; Holt, 2010; Bonin et al., 2012).
Neuropsychological research has revealed the existence of two
partially dissociable neural pathways underlying two different
types of laughter – spontaneous and volitional. One pathway
is emotionally driven and involuntary, arising in subcortical,
limbic, and brainstem areas and culminating in a “laughter-
coordinating” centre in the dorsal upper pons; the other is
a voluntary motor pattern that originates in frontal premotor
areas and directly influences the motor cortex. Damage to the
former pathway inhibits the production of spontaneous (but not
volitional) laughter production, and damage to the latter pathway
inhibits volitional (but not spontaneous) laughter production
(Wild et al., 2003). Spontaneous laughter and volitional laughter
do not only arise from separate neural systems but also appear to
be processed in distinct brain regions, as evidenced by increased
amPFC and anterior cingulate cortex activity when participants
listen to volitional laughter as opposed to spontaneous laughter
(McGettigan et al., 2013). McGettigan et al. (2013) suggest
that volitional laughter induces a stronger engagement of
mentalising processes, and postulate that this is indicative of
attempts to assess the emotional state and intentions of the
laugher.
The conclusions drawn by McGettigan et al. (2013) speak
to a long-standing debate (Fridlund, 1994; Parkinson, 2005;
Feldman Barrett, 2006, 2017) on the function of social signals
and emotions – do they merely indicate the expresser’s felt
state or can they function as active socio-communicative
instruments? Laughter, as one of our most common non-
verbal social signals, is well placed to illuminate this debate.
According to the mainstream view, laughter conveys information
about the laugher’s underlying emotional state and listeners can
decode this information to gain knowledge about other people’s
feelings and motivations. This ‘representational’ approach, where
signals are referential and “about” something, often relies on
the “conduit metaphor” (Reddy, 1979; Rendall et al., 2009),
according to which signals transmit information from and
about their sender and convey it to a receiver who then
decodes the message. The ‘representational’ view of laughter
fits with our everyday use of various types of laughter, such
as joyful laughter, schadenfreude laughter, taunting laughter,
and embarrassed laughter: the laughter indicates the expresser’s
internal state and serves as a “readout” of the laugher’s current
emotions. If the function of social signals is to represent an
internal felt state then discrete representational coding provides
an efficient indication of felt state. These internal states should
be relatively easy to distinguish and there would be distinct
laughter signals that distinguish each discrete “natural kind” of
felt state (Feldman Barrett, 2006). Coming back to the examples
above, distinct kinds of laughter should accompany feelings of
joy, embarrassment, or schadenfreude. However, the lack of
evidence for affect-specific laughter types challenges the notion
that laughter is used to communicate underlying emotional
states. It may be that in these “joint state” cases natural kinds are
not represented, that is there is no discrete or specific “nervous
laughter” or “schadenfreude laughter,” but there is an additive
combination of social signals. For example, some signals may
be to do with nervousness and the laughter signal may have
a different communicative function. An alternative theoretical
view is that, rather than passively transmitting information about
the laugher’s emotional state, laughter is used to influence the
affective states of listeners (Owren and Bachorowski, 2003). To
differentiate between the representational and affect-induction
views of laughter, Owren and Bachorowski use the analogy of
a crying baby. According to the representational account, the
crying merely delivers appropriate encoded information about
the unpleasant feelings that the baby is experiencing and should
stop when the information is provided. An affect-induction
view, on the other hand, holds that the acoustic and visual
qualities of crying induce negative affect in a listener that
persists until the problem is resolved. Similarly, in the case
of primate vocalisations, “the primary function of calling is to
influence listener attention, arousal, and emotion rather than to
transmit information.” Adult human communication, however,
is more complex than a baby’s cry or primate calls and is often
accompanied by verbal messages.
According to Owren and Bachorowski (2003), laughter is also
a form of affect-induction communication. As evidence against
the representational view of this behaviour, they point to its
generalizability and lack of specificity. Namely, the same laugh
may be used to induce positive or negative affect in a listener, and
the interpretation of the same “laugh episode” will be determined
by a number of factors, including the behaviours the laughter
accompanies, the relationship between the laugher and listener,
or the listener’s emotional state when hearing the laughter. Thus,
while in one context a listener may experience a laugh as derisory,
the same laugh may become a positive experience in a different
context–as Papousek et al. (2014) have shown.
The key contrasts between these two approaches are: (1)
the nature of the motivation for the behaviour – in the
representational case the laugher passively indicates their felt
state, in the affect-induction case laughter is used to influence
the receiver’s affect; (2) the level of ambiguity – in the
representational case different laughter types would facilitate
distinguishing between felt states, in the affect-induction case
laughter would be used in conjunction with other social signals
and contextual factors to induce a desired affect. Furthermore,
the laughter would be ambiguous in the absence of social context.
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Here, we propose a modified version of the affect-induction
approach. From the affect-induction perspective affect is induced
through the combination of laughter with additional factors
that dynamically unfold throughout the course of a social
interaction – such as verbal information, social context, or
knowledge of the listener’s emotional state. These factors
influence the receiver and their accurate understanding ensures
that the laughter is interpreted in accordance with the expresser’s
socio-communicative goals. In this view, a laugh by itself is
an underdetermined and ambiguous social signal. In other
words, hearing or viewing somebody laughing without additional
information does not provide enough information to be sure
of their emotional state. Our modified version of the affect-
induction approach takes into account the role of intensity in
laughter communication.
Intensity is an important communicative component of
many social signals and emotional expressions (Banse and
Scherer, 1996; Bänziger and Scherer, 2005; Biele and Grabowska,
2006), and also appears to play an important role in laughter
(Darwin, 1872; van Hooff, 1972; Preuschoft and van Hooff, 1997,
McKeown et al., in preparation). It adds a level of complexity
to our distinctions between representational views and affect-
induction views. Given that voiced laughter produces stronger
affect-related responses in a listener relative to unvoiced laughter
(Bachorowski and Owren, 2001), it follows from the perspective
of the affect-induction approach that different laughter intensities
should vary in the extent to which they induce affect in the
listener; the representational model, on the other hand, would
predict that differing laughter intensities would indicate different
levels of a given felt emotion. It is probable that laughter intensity
reflects a complex interplay between felt emotion and contextual
influences on affect induction, in the same way that emotional
facial expressions are influenced by both these factors (Fridlund,
1994). However, apart from components of the laughter signal
that make a laugh more or less intense, we argue (as others have
argued; e.g., Russell et al., 2003) that there are no morphological
or acoustic markers of laughter that contain meaning in a
representational sense. In other words, there is not a one-to-one
relationship between a felt emotion and laughter produced while
experiencing that emotion. Take the following scenario as an
example. Two people, James and Robin, are having an intense
argument while being observed by a neutral group. James makes a
witty comment that highlights a central flaw in Robin’s argument.
The people observing the argument laugh in response to the
witty comment. Both participants in the argument will hear the
same laughter, but are likely to interpret it differently; James
will interpret the laughter as humorous and an appreciation of
his wit while Robin is likely to interpret it as derisory laughter.
In this scenario identical laughter is taken to signal two very
different emotions – humour and derision. This would not occur
if different emotions were represented by laughter with distinct
acoustic markers. Rather, we propose that laughter is intrinsically
underdetermined and ambiguous, and a listener’s interpretation
of laughter is determined by factors such as the context in
which it occurs. The same view has been taken by Owren and
Bachorowski’s affect-induction approach. However, the modified
affect-induction model differs from the original model in one
key respect. While both models would agree that its inherent
ambiguity allows laughter from different interactions to be
wholly interchangeable without affecting apparent genuineness
of an interaction, the modified version proposes that this
interchangeability is restricted to laughter of similar intensity.
Using a novel experimental approach to test our hypothesis,
we reasoned that participants’ judgements of social interactions
should be unaffected if the laugh response in an original dyadic
interaction is replaced with a similar intensity laugh response
from a different part of the same interaction. In contrast, if a high
intensity laugh response is replaced with a low intensity laugh
response, or vice versa, there should be a measurable reduction
in ‘genuineness’ ratings. Interchangeability of laughter would
be taken as evidence supportive of the affect-induction model’s
central tenet that laughter is an inherently ambiguous signal;
and evidence of intensity-specific interchangeability would
support the modified affection-induction model’s incorporation
of intensity as an important factor in interpreting laughter. If,
however, exchanging laughter always results in an interaction




Here we report on two experiments, in which participants viewed
video sequences displaying two persons. Each sequence involved
a ‘listener’ laughing in response to something a ‘story-teller’ said.
Participants then judged how real or genuine the interaction was,
that is how confident they were that the interaction actually took
place. The recorded interactions contained either high intensity
or low intensity laughter. To differentiate the story-teller from the
laugher we refer to the story-teller as producing a high or low
intensity “laughable context,” and the laugher produces either a
high or low intensity “laugh response.”
Stimuli
Stimuli were generated from interactions created as part of the
ILHAIRE laughter database (McKeown et al., 2015) using a
naturalistic story telling task. The Social Signal Interpretation
framework (Wagner et al., 2013) was used to capture video
and audio information of groups of two or more people. The
task was designed to exert minimal influence on the behaviours
of the interlocutors as they conversed with one another, while
allowing the synchronised capture of high quality audio and
video material.
Intensity Selection
Laugh stimuli were extracted from the original interactions
and rated by participants along a number of dimensions
including laugh intensity and humour, with participants recruited
using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. An informed consent form
explaining the study’s procedure and the experimenter’s contact
details was placed at the very beginning of the ratings form.
MTurk participants were informed that their identity would
remain confidential and that they could withdraw from the
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experiment at any time by simply logging out before completing
the rating exercise. An incomplete data set from a participant
was interpreted as the participant deciding to withdraw from the
experiment, and the relevant data were destroyed. Analysis of
9421 ratings of 870 laugh episodes revealed a strong relationship
between the intensity of a laugh and how much people judged
it to be related to humour (see McKeown and Curran, 2015, for
more detail).
The stimuli used in the following experiment are taken
from two conversational partners participating in an interaction
between three people that lasted for 70 min. Since both social
context and intensity affect emotion perception (Fridlund, 1994),
for this initial experiment we only used the recordings of two
conversational partners who were both male, who shared the
same cultural background, and who were friends. According to
Owren and Bachorowski (2003) male friend pairs should produce
high rates of laughter that are acoustically extreme in both
pitch and duration. The naturalistic form of data gathering has
the effect of producing natural laughter with greater ecological
validity; however, it also means that many of the laugh instances
must be excluded from the experiment as they include other
verbal cues (e.g., speech) and non-verbal cues (e.g., not looking
at the speaker, covering the face with a hand) not related to the
effect of interest.
The laughter selected for intensity rating was laughter in
which there was an unobstructed frontal view of the laugher’s
face, the laugher was looking at the speaker, and there was no
speech during laughter. Laughter was rated for intensity using
the question “Can you rate the intensity of the laugh on a 10
point scale, from 1 no intensity to 10 maximum intensity?”
This rating strategy assumes the laugh rater has a degree of
expertise in laughter through being a lifetime observer of laughter
and consequently minimal instructions are provided to avoid
leading the rater into a particular interpretation of the concept of
laugh intensity. Laughter stimuli assigned to the lowest quartile
of intensity ratings were designated as ‘low intensity’ laughter,
and laughs assigned to the highest quartile were designated as
‘high intensity’ laughter. The corresponding laughable contexts
were not independently rated, but are termed high and low
intensity laughable contexts by virtue of the fact that they
resulted in high or low laugh responses. After the exclusion of
laughter instances that contained verbal and non-verbal cues
not related to the effect of interest, 8 laugh responses combined
with their “laughable” context remained – 4 high intensity and
4 low intensity. These were used to generate the experimental
stimuli.
Stimulus Generation
Each laugh and laughable context was placed alongside each
other on a computer screen to produce a reconstruction of
the interaction (see Figure 1). We generated stimuli for six
conditions: two control conditions containing both the high and
low intensity original interactions; two same intensity conditions,
one containing high intensity laughable contexts with swapped
high intensity laugh responses and another containing low
intensity laughable contexts with swapped low intensity laugh
responses; and two opposite intensity conditions, one containing
FIGURE 1 | Screenshot of the interaction stimuli. The story teller and listener
were positioned on the right and left, respectively. Each interaction lasted
approximately ten seconds, during which time the unfolding story led up to
the laughter event. The listener’s audio–visual stream was frozen at a frame
containing a neutral facial expression up until the point where the laugh
response began. Faces were not blurred during the actual experiment.
high intensity laughable contexts with swapped low intensity
laugh responses and another containing low intensity laughable
contexts with swapped high intensity laugh responses. The
listener’s video stream was frozen at a frame containing a neutral
facial expression up until the point where the laugh response
began; this was to avoid unwanted social cues interfering with the
participants’ perception of the laugh.
In each experiment we adopted a 2 (laugh response
intensity) × 3 (laughable context) design. Laugh responses
had two levels, high or low intensity. Laughable context had
three levels, one control condition (original video) and two
experimental conditions (same intensity, and opposite intensity).
In the ‘same intensity’ condition the listener’s audio–visual stream
was replaced with a recording of the same listener producing a
laugh response with the same intensity, but taken from a different
point in the conversation. In the ‘opposite intensity’ condition the
listener’s laugh response was replaced with a laugh response by
the same listener but with the opposite intensity; that is, low and
high intensity laugh responses were replaced with high and low
intensity laugh responses, respectively. In the control condition
participants viewed the original story-teller/listener interaction.
The dependent variable is the level of confidence that the
interaction is genuine, i.e., that the interaction actually took
place. The exact question is “Can you provide a rating of your
confidence level between 0 (no confidence at all) and 10 (highly
confident) that this is a genuine interaction?
We adopt the statistical recommendations of Cumming
(2012, 2014) and Cumming and Calin-Jageman (2017), using
point estimates with confidence intervals and effect sizes to
convey precision and the magnitude of the experimental effects.
This approach does not change the fundamental frequentist
philosophy in the statistics but alters the emphasis toward
presenting effect sizes and away from point estimates of p-values
through the use of confidence intervals. In addition, we have
created estimated values for our hypotheses, these are arbitrary
estimates in absolute terms but the pattern of results is based
on the reasoning we have outlined. Our scale for the assessment
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of genuine interactions runs from 0 to 10. Aware of the central
tendency and range restriction errors outlined by Saal et al.
(1980) we assume that even when participants strongly believe
that an interaction is genuine they will be reluctant to suggest
a rating of 10; we therefore place our estimate of belief in a
genuine interaction at the upper quartile, 7.5, and our estimate
of a not genuine interaction at the lower quartile of 2.5. For
the two control conditions, which are genuine interactions, we
estimate they will both be viewed as genuine: thus, we predict
that participants will give a maximum genuineness score of 7.5
for original recordings regardless of intensity of the laughable
context/laugh response. Similarly, we predict that maximum
genuineness scores will be given in the interchanged conditions
in which a laugh is replaced with a laugh of the same intensity.
However, where the interchange involves swapping laughs of
different intensity (i.e., the replacement laugh does not match the
laughable context), we predict that such interactions will be seen
as not genuine and will be assigned the lowest genuineness score




One hundred and one participants (40 women, 61 men, mean
age = 33.16 years, age range = 20–68 years) were recruited
using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, a crowdsourcing website
which produces high quality data that are at least as reliable as
those obtained through traditional methods (Casler et al., 2013;
Paolacci and Chandler, 2014).
Materials
The general stimuli generation has already been outlined. In
this experiment, we generated stimuli from two of the four high
intensity laughable contexts and two of the four low intensity
laughable contexts. These laughable contexts were paired with
their original laugh responses to create two stimuli for the high
intensity control condition and two stimuli for the low intensity
control condition. Two different high intensity laugh responses
were randomly selected and paired with the two high intensity
laughable contexts to create two stimuli for the interchanged
same-high-intensity condition. Two different low intensity laugh
responses were randomly selected and paired with the two
low intensity laughable contexts to create two stimuli for the
interchanged same-low-intensity condition. Two different high
intensity laugh responses were randomly selected and paired with
the two low intensity laughable contexts to create two stimuli for
the interchanged opposite-high-intensity condition. Finally, two
different low intensity laugh responses were randomly selected
and paired with the two high intensity laughable contexts to
create two stimuli for the interchanged opposite-low-intensity
condition. This gave a total of 12 stimulus clips in 6 conditions, 2
in each condition.
Procedure
All participants viewed all 12 clips, and provided ratings of level
of confidence that the interaction was genuine for each stimulus.
Results
The general pattern of the results (Figure 3) show that
participants’ genuineness ratings were unaffected when the
listener’s laugh was replaced with a same-intensity laugh from
FIGURE 2 | Hypothesised pattern of results for Experiment 1: Interchanged laughter leads to perceptions of genuine interactions when intensity is the same but not
when intensity is different.
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FIGURE 3 | Point estimates derived from the model for each of the conditions. Red and blue lines plot genuineness ratings of interactions containing high and low
intensity laughter, respectively. Although interactions containing low intensity laughter were consistently judged less genuine than those containing high intensity
laughter, both sets of data reveal a similar trend. In both cases there was no significant change in genuineness ratings when laughter in an original interaction was
replaced with similar intensity laughter. However, replacements with laughter of the opposite intensity result in a measurable reduction in genuineness ratings. Error
bars represent 95% Confidence Intervals.
TABLE 1 | Table of the fixed effects factors for the multi-level model of laugh responses for Experiment 1.
Condition b SE t 95% CI Point estimate M SD
Intercept Control High intensity 7.14 0.20 36.10 6.76, 7.53 7.14 7.14 2.17
High context High context Same intensity −0.28 0.22 −1.26 −0.70, 0.15 6.87 6.87 2.22
Low context Low context Opposite intensity −1.16 0.22 −5.29 −1.59, −0.73 5.98 5.98 2.36
Low intensity Control Low intensity −2.18 0.22 −9.93 −2.61, −1.75 4.96 4.96 2.68
LowC∗LowI Low context Same intensity 0.83 0.31 2.66 0.22, 1.44 4.62 4.62 2.71
HighC∗LowI High context Opposite intensity −0.5 0.31 −1.61 −1.11, 0.11 4.18 4.18 2.3
a different point in the conversation. However, replacing a
laugh with an opposite-intensity laugh resulted in a measurable
reduction in genuineness ratings. An unexpected finding was
that real interactions containing low intensity laughter (Figure 3,
lower line) were consistently judged as less genuine than
real interactions containing high intensity laughter (Figure 3,
upper line). We address the implications of this finding in the
discussion.
The analyses were performed using multi-level models to
generate point estimates of the mean with confidence intervals.
The multi-level approach accounts for the dependency in the data
due to using the same participants to rate more than one video
clip, and avoids underestimation of the standard errors (Quené
and van den Bergh, 2004; McKeown and Sneddon, 2014). Point
estimates are labelled Mest, and arithmetic means and standard
deviations are provided in Table 1. The R (R Core Team, 2017)
package lme4 (Bates et al., 2015) was used for the multilevel
models and generation of profile confidence intervals.
Genuineness scores in the high intensity control condition
were very similar to our hypothesised estimates (Mest = 7.14).
The lowest level of reported genuineness (Mest = 4.18, for high
intensity laughter inserted into a low intensity context) was
considerably more than the hypothesised 2.5, the lowest estimate
of genuineness predicted. The first important difference with our
hypothesised estimates is that the low intensity control condition
was judged as less genuine (Mest = 4.96, 95% CI [4.53, 5.39])
than the high intensity control condition (Mest = 7.14, 95%
CI [6.76, 7.53]), even though both conditions involved genuine
interactions. This suggests that something in the nature of the
low intensity laugh responses and laughable contexts results
in the overall interaction being judged as less genuine than
interactions that contain high intensity laugh responses and
laughable contexts. As a result, we will treat the low intensity
laugh results and high intensity laugh results independently.
We, therefore, use the ratings for the control interactions as
our reference point estimate in the models against which the
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experimental conditions can be compared. Participant variance
was modelled as a random parameter using a random intercept
multilevel model (participant variance = 1.51, SD = 1.23; residual




When laughter from high intensity laughable contexts were
swapped for laughter taken from other high intensity laughable
contexts to produce stimuli of interactions that never occurred,
we found that genuineness ratings were similar to those in
the control condition (Mest = 6.87, 95% CI [6.45, 7.29]). The
model b coefficient provides the best effect size in the units of
the study between the high intensity control condition and the
same intensity condition, representing a reduction of perceived
genuineness of the interaction by 0.28 on the 0–10 scale. Given
the difficulty of choosing a standardised effect size measure
for local effects within mixed-effects regression models (Selya
et al., 2012), we adopt a technique used by Friedmann et al.
(2008) where mean difference scores are calculated from the
model generated point estimates and the control group standard
deviation is used to provide a measure of Cohen’s d; here
d = 0.13. The Common Language Effect Size (CLES) (McGraw
and Wong, 1992; Lakens, 2013) indicates that, after controlling
for individual differences, the likelihood that a person rates the
control interaction stimuli as more genuine than the swapped
laugh stimuli is 54% (50% corresponds to no difference). Thus,
interchanging high intensity laughs has little or no effect on
ratings of the genuineness of an interaction.
Different context
In contrast to the same-context condition, when high intensity
laugh responses were inserted into low intensity laughable
contexts, the mean genuineness ratings were considerably lower
(Mest = 5.98, 95% CI [5.55, 6.41]). A b coefficient of −1.16
provides a study unit effect size estimate of the difference between
the high-intensity control condition and the opposite-intensity
condition–in this case a low-intensity laughable context with
a high-intensity laugh. It represents a reduction of perceived
genuineness of the interaction by 1.16 on the 0–10 scale.
Cohen’s d (0.54) and the CLES indicate that, after controlling
for individual differences, the likelihood that a person rates the
swapped laugh stimuli as less genuine than the control interaction
stimuli is 65%. In terms of Cohen’s d rule of thumb this would be
a medium effect size (Cohen, 1988).
Low Intensity Laughter
Same context
When laughter in low intensity laughable contexts is replaced
with laughter taken from other low intensity laughable contexts
we find that genuineness ratings are once again similar to
those in the control condition (Mest = 4.62, 95% CI [4.01,
5.23]). A b coefficient of 0.83 corresponds to a reduction of
perceived genuineness of the interaction by 0.34 on the 0–
10 scale. Cohen’s d (0.13) and the CLES indicate that, after
controlling for individual differences, the likelihood that a person
rates the control interaction stimuli as more genuine than the
swapped laugh stimuli is 54%. Thus, interchanging a low intensity
laugh has little or no effect on ratings of the genuineness of an
interaction.
Different context
When low intensity laugh responses were inserted into high
intensity laughable contexts the mean genuineness ratings were
the lowest observed in this experiment (Mest = 4.18, 95% CI [3.57,
4.79]). A b coefficient of −0.5 corresponds to a reduction of the
perceived genuineness of the interaction by 0.78 on the 0–10
scale. Cohen’s d (0.29) and the CLES indicate that the likelihood a
person rates the control interaction stimuli as more genuine than
the swapped laugh stimuli is 58%. In terms of Cohen’s d rule of
thumb this would be a small effect.
Acknowledging the historical context of the discipline and the
role of null hypothesis significance testing within this context,
and due to the importance of the issues raised by Gelman and
Stern (2006) we also present the results of this analysis using
a 2 × 3 ANOVA. We present the main effects and interaction
effect of the ANOVA but encourage researchers to give more
prominent attention toward the simple main effects using the
multi-level model generated point estimates and confidence
interval approach for detailed analysis with respect to theoretical
concerns. There is a significant main effect of laughable context
F(2,1206) = 9.38, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.01. There is also a significant
main effect of laugh intensity F(1,1206) = 204.04, p < 0.001,
η2 = 0.14. Finally, there is a significant interaction of laughable
context and laugh intensity F(2,1206) = 7.1, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.01.
Discussion
The results of Experiment 1 provide support for our hypothesis
that laughter of the same intensity can be interchanged with
other laughs of similar intensity without affecting the apparent
genuineness of the interaction. Where the level of laughter
intensity does not match the context into which it is inserted,
effects are observed – a medium effect size in the case of high
intensity laugh response and a small effect size in the case
of low intensity laugh responses. The finding that laughs of
similar intensity are wholly interchangeable without affecting an
interaction’s perceived genuineness provides a proof of concept
for our hypothesis that laughter is inherently ambiguous; as such
this finding poses a challenge for the representational model of
laughter and is consistent with the affect-induction model.
An additional important finding is the overall reduction in
genuineness associated with low intensity laughs. The genuine
low-intensity situation was judged to be less genuine than the
worst case condition that contained a high intensity laugh
response. It appears that even when strong laughter occurs with
no expectation cues, these interactions are deemed to be more
genuine than real interactions that contain low intensity laughter.
There are some limitations to this study. We only used
four of the eight actual laugh contexts selected, and we cannot
rule out the possibility that the present findings were due to
specific features of the contexts displayed in the stimuli. Another
caveat is that all the stimuli were judged by each participant
in this experiment, allowing for the possibility that judgements
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of a laugh were made relative to responses to other laughs
paired with the same context. These limitations are addressed in
Experiment 2.
EXPERIMENT 2
Experiment 2 was a direct replication of Experiment 1, but with
additional manipulations that address the above limitations. The
number of stimuli used was increased to the maximum possible
given the selection of eight usable contexts. In addition, we
also wished to remove the possibility that responses to previous
stimuli combinations were interfering with judgements being
made about the genuineness of a given interaction. We excluded
this possibility by ensuring that each participant saw each laugh
context only once. We hypothesised that the results would follow
the same pattern observed in Experiment 1.
Method
Participants
As we were not getting more than one rating per context from
the participants in this experiment we increased the sample size
and recruited 404 participants (153 women, 251 men, mean
age = 33.16 years, age range = 20–68 years) via Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk.
Stimulus Generation
The stimuli were created using the same eight laughs selected
for use in Experiment 1. The main difference was that on this
occasion we created all possible stimulus combinations with the
eight laugh contexts. This gave a total of 64 stimulus clips. The
same 2 (laugh response intensity) × 3 (laughable context) design
was used in the presentation of the stimuli, giving six conditions.
There were four original high intensity laughter clips in the
high intensity control condition; 4 original low intensity clips
in the low intensity control condition; 12 high intensity clips in
the high-same-intensity condition; 12 low intensity clips in the
low-same-intensity condition; 16 low intensity laughter clips in
the high-opposite-intensity condition; 16 high intensity clips in
the low-opposite-intensity condition.
Procedure
The procedure was the same as in Experiment 1 except on this
occasion we showed eight videos to each participant and ensured
that no laughter-inducing context was repeated in a given
experimental run. We randomly selected one of the laughter
stimuli for each laugh context for presentation to the participants.
The condition cells are necessarily imbalanced due to the
nature of the stimulus generation; there are only eight genuine
interactions to create the control conditions, only 24 stimuli can
be used in the same intensity conditions as the control conditions
cannot be used, and there are 32 possible combinations for
the opposite intensity conditions. These differences in number
of stimuli and number of participants across the cell sizes are
largely accommodated by the use of multi-level models, which are
more robust to unequal cell sizes than repeated measure ANOVA
models.
Results
The absolute numerical estimates for the conditions were slightly
different from Experiment 1, but the pattern was the same
(see Figure 4): in the control condition using low intensity
laughter genuineness was again rated lower (Mest = 5.08, 95% CI
[4.59, 5.57]) than in the control condition using high intensity
FIGURE 4 | Point estimates derived from the model for each of the conditions. Error bars represent 95% Confidence Intervals.
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TABLE 2 | Table of the fixed effects factors for the multi-level model of laugh responses for Experiment 2.
Condition b SE t 95% CI Point estimate M SD
Intercept Control High intensity 6.76 0.20 34.67 6.38, 7.15 6.76 6.76 2.17
High context High context Same intensity −0.02 0.21 −0.13 −0.44, 0.38 6.75 6.7 2.39
Low context Low context Opposite intensity −1.16 0.20 −5.69 −1.56, −0.76 5.60 5.57 2.94
Low intensity Control Low intensity −1.69 0.25 −6.74 −2.18, −1.20 5.08 5.1 2.8
LowC∗LowI Low context Same intensity 0.78 0.29 2.74 0.22, 1.34 4.69 4.72 2.81
HighC∗LowI High context Opposite intensity 0.05 0.28 0.19 −0.50, 0.61 5.1 5.13 2.86
laughter (Mest = 6.76, 95% CI [6.38, 7.15]). Once again, we
used a multi-level model to generate point estimates of the
mean with profile confidence intervals. Participant variance was
modelled as a random parameter using a random intercept
multilevel model (participant variance = 1.69, SD = 1.3; residual




When laugh responses from high intensity laughable contexts
are swapped for laugh responses taken from other high intensity
laughable contexts we find that genuineness ratings are almost
identical to those in the control condition (Mest = 6.75, 95% CI
[6.45, 7.21]). A b coefficient of −0.02 represents a reduction of
perceived genuineness of the interaction relative to the control
condition by 0.02 on the 0–10 scale. Cohen’s d (0.01) and
the CLES indicate that the likelihood that a person rates the
control interaction stimuli as more genuine than the swapped
laugh stimuli is 50%; this suggests that interchanging high
intensity laughs has no effect on ratings of the genuineness of an
interaction.
Different context
When high intensity laughter was inserted into low intensity
laughable contexts the mean genuineness ratings were
considerably lower (Mest = 5.60, 95% CI [5.2, 6]). A b coefficient
of −1.16 represents a reduction of perceived genuineness of the
interaction by 1.16 on the 0–10 scale. Cohen’s d (0.47) and the
CLES indicate that the likelihood a person rates the swapped
laugh stimuli as less genuine than the control interaction stimuli




When laughter from low intensity laughable contexts is replaced
with laughter from other low intensity laughable contexts we
obtain a pattern of ratings (Mest = 4.69, 95% CI [4.13, 5.25])
similar to experiment 1. A b coefficient of 0.78 represents a
difference in perceived genuineness by 0.78 between the two
conditions. Cohen’s d (0.14) and the CLES indicate that the
likelihood that a person rates the swapped laugh stimuli as
less genuine than the control interaction stimuli is 54%. Thus,
interchanging low intensity laughs has little or no effect on ratings
of the genuineness of an interaction.
Different context
On this occasion when low intensity laughter was inserted
into high intensity laughable contexts the mean genuineness
ratings (Mest = 5.1, 95% CI [4.55, 5.65]) were at similar
levels to the control reference condition. A b coefficient of
0.05 indicates an increase in the perceived genuineness of the
interaction by 0.05 on the 0–10 scale. Cohen’s d (0.02) and the
CLES indicate that the likelihood a person rates the swapped
laugh as less genuine than the control interaction stimuli is
51%. Interchanging a low intensity laugh into a high intensity
laughable context has no effect on ratings of the genuineness
of an interaction. Interchanging a low intensity laugh into a
high intensity laughable context has no effect on ratings of the
genuineness of an interaction.
Once again, we present the main effects and interaction
effect of the ANOVA but encourage researcher to give more
prominent attention toward the simple main effects using the
multi-level model generated point estimates and confidence
interval approach for detailed analysis with respect to theoretical
concerns. There is a significant main effect of laughable context
F(2,3226) = 31.15, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.01. There is also a significant
main effect of laugh intensity F(1,3226) = 138.75, p < 0.001,
η2 = 0.04. Finally, there is a significant interaction of laughable
context and laugh F(2,3226) = 7.01, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.004.
Discussion
The pattern of results for high intensity laughter in Experiment
2 is even more similar to the original hypothesis than
those observed in Experiment 1. Genuineness ratings are
almost identical for the control and ‘same intensity’ conditions
with a drop off in genuineness ratings for the ‘opposite
intensity’ condition. This provides strong support for the
original hypothesis in the case of high intensity laughter. Thus,
interchanging high intensity laughter seems to have little or no
effect on the perceived level of genuineness of the interaction.
The pattern of results for low intensity laughter is somewhat
different to those from Experiment 1, the key difference being
that genuineness ratings do not drop off in the ‘opposite intensity’
condition. This is the only condition that failed to replicate
results of Experiment 1. It may be that low intensity laughter
is inherently more ambiguous than high intensity laughter;
McKeown et al. (in preparation) argue that low intensity laughter
has many more functions than high intensity laughter, with
the latter more closely related to the assessment of humour
production. Although low intensity laughter is seen as being part
of less genuine interactions, these interactions are not rated as
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‘not genuine’; rather they occupy the midpoint on the scale. It
may be that high intensity laughter may more unequivocally
indicate genuineness whereas low intensity laughter can be
interpreted in many different ways–thus increasing the likelihood
it will be viewed as being consistent with the context it is inserted
into.
Another way of understanding the results may be that the
nature of these laughter effects in the two opposite scenario
interactions leads to quite different interpretations of the social
interaction. In one a high intensity laugh response occurs
despite the story-teller not providing contextual cues that a high
intensity laugh was expected. Laughter in such a scenario might
reasonably be interpreted as an over effusive laugh response, and
consequently the interaction deemed to be less genuine. In the
other case the contextual cues did indicate that a high intensity
laugh response was expected but was greeted with a low intensity
laugh–an interactional situation that may be observed to be an
insult or social rejection–these situations were rated as the least
genuine of all.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The experiments reported here address an important question
regarding the function of laughter; namely, is it used to signal
the laugher’s underlying emotional state or is its function to
influence the listener’s emotional state? This question addresses
a current debate on the function of human laughter. While
the representational model of laughter proposes that laughter
encodes information about the laugher’s emotion(s), which is
then decoded by the listener, the affect-induction model depicts
laughter as a communicative tool with which to influence the
emotions of the listener. The representational model views
laughter as an unambiguous signal of the laugher’s emotional
state; the affect-induction model, on the other hand, proposes
that laughter interpretation is determined by situational factors.
Thus, unlike the representational model, the affect-induction
model would predict that laughter is an ambiguous signal
subject to contextual influences. Our experiments sought to pit
the two models against each other by switching laughter in
an original interaction with different laughter from a different
part of the interaction. The representational model would
predict that participants should be able to differentiate between
original interactions and interactions in which laughter has
been switched; the affect-induction model, on the other hand,
would predict that participants would not be able to make
this distinction. Furthermore, we argued that any inability to
differentiate between original interactions and those in which
laughter has been switched should be restricted to original and
replacement laughs of similar intensity.
The results of Experiment 1 show that participants’ ratings of
an interaction’s genuineness were unaffected when the listener’s
laughter was swapped for another instance of laughter of similar
intensity and from the same listener, but from a different point
of the interaction. However, replacing listener laughter with
laughter of a different intensity resulted in participants rating
the story telling interaction as less genuine. This demonstration
of the ambiguous nature of same intensity laughter is consistent
with the affect-induction model, which would argue that laughter
is necessarily ambiguous as regards the laugher’s underlying
emotional state.
Experiment 1 had a number of limitations. For example, not all
possible context – laughter combinations were used to generate
the stimuli. Furthermore, participants would have viewed each
context several times, with each containing a different laugh
stimulus; thus it is feasible that responses to a given context would
have been tempered by previous responses to the same context
(but paired with different laughter). Experiment 2 overcame
these limitations by using the full range of context-laughter
combinations and ensuring that participants were presented with
each context only once. The results of Experiment 2 replicated
those of Experiment 1 in all but one condition. When laughter
(high or low intensity) was switched for laughter of a similar
intensity, participants’ genuineness judgements were unaffected.
When high intensity laughter was inserted into a low intensity
context, participants judged the interaction as less genuine.
However, this was not the case when low intensity laughter was
inserted into a high intensity context; rather, the interaction
was judged to be as genuine as the control and same-intensity
conditions. It has been proposed that low intensity laughter is
functionally more complex and inherently more ambiguous than
high intensity laughter (McKeown et al., in preparation), and
this may explain why inserting a low intensity laugh into a high
intensity context did not result in the interaction appearing less
genuine.
An interesting finding was that interactions retaining their
original low intensity laughter were consistently judged less
genuine than those retaining their original high intensity
laughter. Previous research highlighting physiological differences
between spontaneous and volitional laughter production (Bryant
and Aktipis, 2014) might offer an explanation for this finding.
It would be reasonable to assume that differences in the
sounds of spontaneous and volitional laughter are likely to
be magnified with increasing laughter intensity, and that it
should be more difficult to differentiate between low intensity
spontaneous and volitional laughter. The low genuineness ratings
of the low intensity laughs might, therefore, be a consequence
of the relative difficulty in correctly identifying spontaneous
low intensity laughter. In other words, if participants are
uncertain about a laugh’s spontaneity they will be more likely
to identify the interaction as being less genuine. This may
explain why the observed reduction in genuineness scores in
Experiment 1 when low intensity laughter was combined with
a different intensity context did not generalise to Experiment
2. Recall that Experiment 2 was motivated by a desire to use
more laughter stimuli than in Experiment 1. A consequence
of this was that a higher proportion (75%) of low intensity
laughs in Experiment 2 were voiced compared to Experiment
1 (50%). If voiced laughter is judged as more genuine, then
the higher proportion of voiced laughter in Experiment 2
might explain the different results in this condition across
experiments.
The results of our experiments provide compelling evidence
that laughter is an inherently ambiguous stimulus, and that its
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interpretation is largely determined by the context in which
it occurs. As such these results support the affect-induction
model. While it is the case that we often talk of laughter ‘types,’
such as sardonic laughter, joyful laughter, taunting laughter,
and schadenfreude laughter, our results suggest that different
instances of same-intensity laughter are largely interchangeable
and that their specific meaning may be largely determined by
the context in which they occur. This flexibility is reminiscent
of recent, similar findings relating to the facial expression of
emotions. Historically, it has been widely accepted that the
facial expression of emotion is underpinned by emotion-specific
facial musculature activation patterns (Ekman and Friesen,
1971); from this perspective a sad facial expression and a
fearful facial expression are associated with distinct combinations
of facial movements. However, recent developments suggest
that, despite all their information value, facial expressions can
be ambiguous and that their meaning is largely dependent
on contextual information beyond the face (Aviezer et al.,
2011; Barrett et al., 2011; Hassin et al., 2013). Our results
suggest that the important role of context in the perception
of facial expressions also applies to the interpretation of
laughter.
CONCLUSION
We tested which of two models, representational or affect-
induction, best describes the function of laughter. We devised
novel experiments such that the two models made opposite
predictions, and found that the results are consistent with the
affect-induction model’s prediction.
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